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SHARING TRANSLATIONS OR 
SUPPORTING TERROR?
AN ANALYSIS OF TAREK MEHANNA 
IN THE AFTERMATH OF 
HOLDER v. HUMANITARIAN LAW PROJECT
innokenty Pyetranker*
i. introDuCtion
On October 21, 2009, Tarek Mehanna was arrested by federal authorities for allegedly violat-
ing 18 U.S.C. § 2339A and 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, the terrorist material support statutes.1  Mehanna’s 
subsequent indictment, prosecution, and conviction became the subject of  intense media scrutiny.2  
Unlike hundreds of  suspected foreign terrorists, Mehanna was not captured by U.S. military person-
nel in a war-torn country halfway around the world; he is an American citizen3 who was picked up 
in his parents’ home in upscale Sudbury, Massachusetts.4  Evidence presented by the government, 
including an internet chat in which Mehanna adoringly labeled Osama bin Laden his “real father,”5 
lent support to the prosecutor’s first words in his opening statement: Mehanna had “answered a call 
* J.D. candidate, Harvard Law School, 2013; B.A., Columbia University, 2010. I am enormously grateful to Professors 
Theodore Heinrich and Robert Chesney for their indispensable guidance and assistance with this project. 
1  Claire Suddath, Alleged U.S. Terrorist Tarek Mehanna, tiMe, Oct. 22, 2009, available at http://www.time.com/time/
nation/article/0,8599,1931521,00.html. 
2  See, e.g., Abby Goodnough & Liz Robbins, Mass. Man Arrested in Terrorism Case, n.y. tiMes, Oct. 21, 2009, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/22/us/22terror.html (“Tarek Mehanna, 27, was charged with conspiring to provide 
material support to terrorists.”); Dina Temple-Raston, In Boston Terrorism Trial, A Free Speech Defense, nPr, Oct. 27, 2011, 
http://www.npr.org/2011/10/27/141740974/in-boston-terrorism-trial-a-free-speech-defense (“Opening statements . . . 
in . . . terrorism trial involving a young Massachusetts man named Tarek Mehanna.”); Peter Schworm, Mehanna Conviction 
Stirs Outcry on Rights, boston globe, Dec. 22, 2011, available at http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2011/12/22/
mehanna-conviction-stirs-outcry-rights/I73lyAEVWYdBtGLIoi6LBJ/story.html (“To many civil libertarians, the 
conviction of  Tarek Mehanna…undermined free speech rights . . . .”). 
3  See Martin Finucane, The Terror Defendant Who Allegedly Called People ‘Dude’, boston.CoM, Oct. 26, 2011, 
http://www.boston.com/Boston/metrodesk/2011/10/the-terror-defendant-who-allegedly-called-people-dude/
UOEqhEDQ7uaWEUuWP2M4SK/index.html (describing Mehanna as “a US citizen born in Pittsburgh . . . .”). 
4  Suddath, supra note 1.
5  Denise Lavoie, Friend: Mehanna Dubbed Osama Bin Laden His “Real Father”, Cbs boston, Nov. 3, 2011, http://boston.
cbslocal.com/2011/11/03/friend-mehanna-dubbed-osama-bin-laden-his-real-father/.
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to action from Osama bin Laden to fight and kill American soldiers.”6  Mehanna’s attorneys, on the 
other hand, denied that their client was promoting terrorism and instead portrayed him as an Ameri-
can “exercising his free speech rights to show anger over the U.S. invasion of  Iraq.”7
Tarek Mehanna is not unique because his attorneys disagreed with prosecutors about his guilt.  
Indeed, every indicted criminal defendant who pleads “not guilty” to the charges presented against 
him or her ostensibly challenges the government’s accusations.  What makes Mehanna special is that 
one of  the acts that he was accused of  – translating videos and publications promoting violent jihad8 
– stands uncomfortably and ambiguously at the nexus between legal, constitutionally-protected 
activities and illegal, criminally-punishable acts.  Did Mehanna’s activities amount to material support 
to terrorism?  The federal government argued yes, while Mehanna’s defense counsel maintained that 
the answer was no.  Although the twelve jurors that were convened for the Mehanna trial rendered a 
verdict of  guilty, the question of  whether actions like Mehanna’s constitute violations of  the material 
support statutes remains highly controversial.
This article aims to achieve an in-depth understanding of  precisely this controversy by analyz-
ing Mehanna’s actions through the lens of Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,9 a landmark June 2010 
Supreme Court case that upheld the constitutionality of  the terrorist material support prohibitions.  
In Part II of  this Article, I briefly describe the historical circumstances surrounding the material 
support statutes, specifically the September 11th terrorist attacks and the Patriot Act of  2001, the 
government’s legislative response to the attacks.  In Part III, I review Holder v. Humanitarian Law 
Project and examine current academic literature on the case to explain its significance.  In Part IV, 
the analytical nucleus of  this Article, I search for insights into the contours of  the terrorist material 
support statutes by investigating significant appellate-level decisions that cite Holder v. Humanitarian 
Law Project.  Part V returns to the trial of  Tarek Mehanna, focusing on a pair of  opposing motions 
submitted by the defense and the prosecution, both of  which cite Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project. 
Part VI concludes.
ii. historiCal Context 
A. SePtember 11, 2001
When then-U.S. President George W. Bush addressed the American people on September 11, 
6  Lauren Keiper, Trial of  Massachusetts Man Accused of  Aiding Terrorism Begins, reuters (Oct. 28, 2011, 5:54pm EDT), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/28/us-usa-crime-mehanna-idUSTRE79Q7FX20111028. 
7  Lavoie, supra note 5.
8  See Second Superseding Indictment, United States v. Mehanna, No. 09-CR-10017-GAO (D. Mass. June 17, 2010), 
2010 WL 2516469.  The indictment depicts Mehanna’s translations as elements of  material support offenses on several 
occasions, including the twenty-first “overt act” committed in furtherance of  Mehanna’s conspiracy to violate 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2339B, id. at 8, and the nineteenth “overt act” committed in furtherance of  Mehanna’s conspiracy to violate 18 U.S.C. § 
2339A, id. at 15-16.
9  Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010).
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2001, he called the day’s events “a series of  deliberate and deadly terrorist acts.”10  President Bush 
was correct; it would eventually become clear that members of  al Qaeda, an extremist terrorist 
network founded by Osama bin Laden, were behind the four coordinated attacks that occurred on 
the morning of  September 11, 2001.11  The terrorists hijacked and intentionally crashed two of  the 
planes into the Twin Towers of  the World Trade Center in New York, one plane into the Pentagon 
in Virginia, and the final plane into a field in Pennsylvania.12  The total number of  Americans that 
perished on September 11th – nearly 3,000 – was greater than the number lost at Pearl Harbor in 
December 1941.13  In a single day, the United States transformed from a seemingly invincible super-
power poised to project its influence all over the globe to a seemingly vulnerable victim of  terrorist 
attacks on its own soil.
Likewise, the priorities of  the United States changed overnight: under the Clinton and pre-9/11 
Bush administrations, “[t]errorism was not the overriding national security concern for the U.S. 
government,”14 but after September 11th, the federal government “turned its entire attention to 
formulating and executing a response.”15  Along with efforts on the international stage, including 
the commencement of  the U.S. invasion of  Afghanistan to “capture or kill individuals believed to 
be responsible for the September 11 attacks and to topple the Taliban regime that harbored them,”16 
the federal government passed new anti-terrorism laws, including the “Uniting and Strengthening 
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of  
2001,” commonly known as the Patriot Act.17  Among its many provisions, the Patriot Act granted 
“wiretapping and surveillance authority to federal law enforcement;” removed “barriers between 
law enforcement and intelligence agencies;” and gave “greater authority to the Attorney General 
to detain and deport aliens suspected of  having terrorist ties.”18  The Patriot Act also amended the 
10  Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation, the white house arChives, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.
archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911-16.html (last visited Dec. 16, 2011).
11  See Maria Newman, Bin Laden Takes Responsibility for 9/11 Attacks in New Tape, n.y. tiMes, Oct. 29, 2004, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/29/international/30osamaCND.html  (describing a message from Osama bin Laden 
that aired on Al-Jazeera just before the 2004 presidential elections, in which bin Laden claims direct responsibility for the 
September 11 attacks).
12  Note, Responding to Terrorism: Crime, Punishment, and War, 115 harv. l. rev. 1217, 1221 (2002).
13  See nat’l CoMM’n on terrorist attaCks uPon the u.s., the 9/11 CoMMission rePort: exeCutive suMMary 1-2 
(2004) available at http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report_Exec.pdf.
14  Id. at 10.
15  Note, supra note 12, at 1222; see also Eric Sandberg-Zakia, Beyond Guantanamo: Two Constitutional Objections to 
Nonmilitary Preventive Detention, 2 harv. nat’l seC. J. 283, 291 (2011) (“In the years since the September 11, 2001, 
terrorist attacks on the Pentagon, World Trade Center, and passengers and crew of  four commercial airplanes, the U.S. 
government has made counterterrorism a primary undertaking.”).
16  Note, supra note 12, at 1222.
17  Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism 
(USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of  2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) [hereinafter the Patriot Act].
18  Michael T. McCarthy, USA Patriot Act, 39 harv. J. on legis. 435, 435 (2002).
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material support statutes, 18 U.S.C. § 2339A and 18 U.S.C. § 2339B.19  These two statutes eventually 
became “the heart of  the Justice Department’s terrorist prosecution efforts.”20
In its present form, 18 U.S.C. § 2339A outlaws support for terrorism by turning the following 
acts into federal criminal offenses:
(1) (a) attempting to,  
(b) conspiring to, or  
(c) actually 
(2) (a) providing material support or resources, or 
(b) concealing or disguising 
i. the nature, 
ii. location,  
iii. source, or  
iv. ownership 
of  material support or resources  
(3) knowing or intending that they be used  
(a) in preparation for,  
(b) in carrying out, 
(c) in preparation for concealment of  an escape from, or 
(d) in carrying out the concealment of  an escape from 
(4) an offense identified as a federal crime of  terrorism.21
Section 2339A(b) also provides three key definitions. “Material support or resources” is defined 
in the following way:
[A]ny property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or monetary instru-
ments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, 
safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, 
weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel (1 or more individuals who may be or in-
clude oneself), and transportation, except medicine or religious materials.22
“Training” is defined as “instruction or teaching designed to impart a specific skill, as opposed 
to general knowledge.”23  Finally, “expert advice or assistance” is defined as “advice or assistance 
19  See Katherine R. Zerwas, No Strict Scrutiny – the Court’s Deferential Position on Material Support to Terrorism in Holder v. 
Humanitarian Law Project, 37 wM. MitChell l. rev. 5337, 5339 (2011) (discussing how the Patriot Act strengthened the 
punitive measures in the material support statutes).
20  Charles Doyle, Cong. researCh serv., r41333, terrorist Material suPPort: an overview oF 18 u.s.C. 2339a 
anD 2339b 1 (2010), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41333.pdf. .
21  Id. at 15.
22  18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2006).
23  Id.
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derived from scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge.”24 
In its present form, 18 U.S.C. § 2339B outlaws support for designated foreign terrorist organiza-
tions by turning the following acts into federal criminal offenses:
(1) (a) attempting to provide, 
(b) conspiring to provide, or 
(c) actually providing
(2) material support or resources 
(3) to a foreign terrorist organization
(4) knowing that the organization 
(a) has been designated a foreign terrorist organization, or 
(b) engages, or has engaged, in “terrorism” or “terrorist activity.”25
According to the law, the term “material support or resources” has the same meaning in section 
2339B as in section 2339A.26  Section 2339B also includes two other clauses that explain the term 
“material support or resources.”  In subsection (h), the law provides that:
No person may be prosecuted under this section in connection with the term “personnel” 
unless that person has knowingly provided, attempted to provide, or conspired to provide a 
foreign terrorist organization with 1 or more individuals (who may be or include himself) to 
work under that terrorist organization’s direction or control or to organize, manage, super-
vise, or otherwise direct the operation of  that organization. Individuals who act entirely 
independently of  the foreign terrorist organization to advance its goals or objectives shall 
not be considered to be working under the foreign terrorist organization’s direction and 
control.27
Subsection (i) further specifies that “[n]othing in this section shall be construed or applied so as 
to abridge the exercise of  rights guaranteed under the First Amendment to the Constitution of  the 
United States.”28
Dissecting the minutiae of  the two material support statutes is no abstract academic exercise.  
In the ten years following September 11, 2001, sections 2339A and 2339B have each been utilized 
over 100 times in criminal prosecutions.29  Moreover, the use of  the material support statutes has 
increased over time; since 2009, these two statutes have become the most commonly used laws in 
24  Id.
25  18 u.s.C. § 2339B (2006). 
26  Id.
27  Id.
28  Id.
29  See Ctr. on Law & Sec., Terrorist Trial Report Card 13 (2011), available at http://www.lawandsecurity.org/
Portals/0/Documents/TTRC%20Ten%20Year%20Issue.pdf  (identifying common charges in terrorism prosecutions). 
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terrorist prosecutions.30
iii. Holder v. Humanitarian law Project 
A. Facts and Holding
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project was the “key legal challenge” to the material support stat-
utes.31  Much ink has been spilled rehashing the case’s complicated background and proceedings, 
but the issues presented to the Supreme Court were relatively straightforward.  The central question 
considered was the legality of  section 2339B’s proscription of  material support for the humanitar-
ian and political activities of  two designated foreign terrorist organizations, the Kurdistan Work-
ers’ Party (PKK) and the Liberation Tigers of  Tamil Eelam (LTTE).32  The PKK and the LTTE 
are not mere terrorist groups; it was “undisputed in the litigation” that the two organizations are 
“dual-purpose groups – that is, these groups possessed both lawful social and political goals as 
well as unlawful violent ones.”33  The plaintiffs, a group of  U.S. citizens and organizations, were 
determined to give money as well as training in international law and advocacy to the PKK and the 
LTTE in order to facilitate the lawful, nonviolent purposes of  the groups.34  Seeking an injunction 
to prohibit the enforcement of  the material support statute with regard to the PKK and the LTTE, 
the plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of  18 U.S.C. § 2339B on the grounds that the statute 
infringed on their constitutional rights because it was “too vague, in violation of  the Fifth Amend-
ment,” and “it infringe[d] their rights to freedom of  speech and association, in violation of  the First 
Amendment.”35  The government’s arguments included the assertions that section 2339B “[did] not 
target speech per se, but instead regulate[d] the conduct of  providing support to designated terrorist 
organizations, even if  that support [took] the form of  speech,” that “the government had an inter-
est in delegitimizing designated terrorist groups,” and that “any contribution, including of  speech, 
furthered that group’s violent purposes and therefore could be banned.”36
The Supreme Court’s 6-3 majority opinion in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project posited a three-
pronged holding.  First, the Court found that “the plaintiffs’ claims of  vagueness lack[ed] merit” 
because the terms that the plaintiffs alleged were vague – “training,” “expert advice or assistance,” 
“service,” and “personnel” – were not vague because they did not require “untethered, subjective 
judgments” and, indeed, were “clear in their application to plaintiffs’ proposed conduct.”37  Second, 
the Court held that the material support statute did not violate freedom of  speech because material 
30  See id. at 14.
31  Michael G. Freedman, Prosecuting Terrorism: The Material Support Statute and Muslim Charities, 38 hastings Const. l.Q. 
1113, 1119 (2011).
32  Id. at 1120.
33  Amanda Shanor, Beyond Humanitarian Law Project: Promoting Human Rights in A Post-9/11 World, 34 suFFolk 
transnat’l l. rev. 519, 521 (2011).
34  Freedman, supra note 31, at 1120.
35  Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2712 (2010).
36  Shanor, supra note 33, at 523.
37  Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2719-20.
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support is “carefully drawn to cover only a narrow category of  speech to, under the direction of, 
or in coordination with foreign groups that the speaker knows to be terrorist organizations.”38  The 
Court further explained the second part of  the holding in the following way:
Plaintiffs want to speak to the PKK and the LTTE, and whether they may do so under § 
2339B depends on what they say. If  plaintiffs’ speech to those groups imparts a “specific 
skill” or communicates advice derived from “specialized knowledge” – for example, train-
ing on the use of  international law or advice on petitioning the United Nations – then it is 
barred . . . . On the other hand, plaintiffs’ speech is not barred if  it imparts only general or 
unspecialized knowledge.39
Third, the Court ruled that section 2339B did not violate plaintiffs’ freedom of  association by 
upholding the Ninth Circuit’s rejection of  this First Amendment claim.  Specifically, the Court 
reasoned that “[t]he statute [did] not prohibit being a member of  one of  the designated groups or 
vigorously promoting and supporting the political goals of  the group . . . [w]hat [§ 2339B] prohibits 
is the act of  giving material support . . . .”40
B. Analysis
The Supreme Court’s holding in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project upheld the constitutionality of  
the material support statutes and paved for the way for the federal government to continue pros-
ecuting the statutes’ transgressors.  The decision also quickly became a fount of  controversy because 
of  its potential impact on the seemingly ever-expanding definition of  terrorism-related crimes. 
Scholars noted that because the Humanitarian Law Project opinion “deferred to Congress’ finding 
that there is no meaningful separation between a terrorist organization’s legal and illegal activities,” 
the material support statutes could now definitively treat “support for one” as “functionally equiva-
lent to support for the other.”41  Michael J. Ellis wrote that, as a result of  the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion, “it is difficult to imagine any activity a member of  a foreign terrorist organization could engage 
in that would not violate the material support statute.”42  Citing the 2009 conviction of  Javed Iqbal 
for “violating the criminal prohibition against providing material support to a terrorist organization 
by helping to broadcast Hezbollah’s TV station Al-Manar,” Daphne Barak-Erez and David Scharia 
concluded that the Court’s decision in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project “embodies the peak of  
other legal efforts of  the United States government to fight terrorist activities by limiting the speech 
that supports them.”43  Likewise, members of  the legal community began questioning the decision’s 
38  Id. at 2722-23.
39  Id. at 2723-24.
40  Id. at 2730 (citing Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1133 (9th Cir. 2000)).
41  Ctr. on Law & Sec., supra note 29, at 21.
42  Michael J. Ellis, Disaggregating Legal Strategies in the War on Terror, 121 yale l.J. 237, 242 (2011) (emphasis added).
43  Daphne Barak-Erez & David Scharia, Freedom of  Speech, Support for Terrorism, and the Challenge of  Global Constitutional 
Law, 2 harv. nat’l seC. J. 1, 3 (2011).
28 NATIONAL SECURITY LAW BRIEF Vol. 2, No. 2
(likely negative) influence on the future of  Muslim charities44 and human rights groups.45
Some commentators, however, offered an alternative view of  the Court’s holding.  Katherine 
R. Zerwas, for instance, predicted that this was “likely not the end of  litigation challenging section 
2339B” because “[t]he Court’s fact-specific interpretation of  the plaintiffs’ arguments could permit 
future litigants to bring a challenge on slightly different facts.”46  Indeed, Chief  Justice Roberts’s ma-
jority opinion affirmed that the majority did not “address the resolution of  more difficult cases that 
may arise under the statute in the future.”47  For more difficult – that is, more ambiguous – instances 
of  material support, the impact of  the Humanitarian Law Project decision remained unclear.  The lim-
its of  the material support statutes, it seems, would be determined on a case-by-case basis.
iv. the aFterMath oF Holder v. Humanitarian law Project
At first blush, the material support statutes appear relatively straightforward when viewed in light 
of  Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project: the case appears to hold that giving material support of  almost 
any kind – including any service or tangible or intangible property – to terrorists or a foreign terror-
ist organization is proscribed, and that this proscription is not vague or unconstitutional on First or 
Fifth Amendment grounds. 
Determining whether a given act – such as translating a document – constitutes material sup-
port, however, remains a relatively contentious undertaking.  That is, since Humanitarian Law Project 
was decided, a number of  individuals have challenged their material support convictions by arguing 
that their actions did not amount to material support to terrorism.  Naturally, a discussion of  Hu-
manitarian Law Project surfaced in several of  the decisions that resolved those appeals.  In the remain-
der of  this section, I survey a selection of  such cases in order to learn about the contours of  the 
terrorist material support statutes as understood by federal judges.  One of  the cases, United States 
v. Bahlul, was not decided by a judge in an Article Three Court; United States v. Al-Bahlul was decided 
in a Court of  Military Commission Review, a tribunal created by the Military Commissions Act of  
2006.48  However, one of  the offenses that Ali al-Bahlul was charged with was modeled after the 
material support statutes,49 so the court’s reasoning in the Bahlul decision is instructive with regard to 
interpretations of  the material support statutes.  As for the other four decisions surveyed below, the 
authors are judges on the United States Courts of  Appeals.
44  See generally Freedman, supra note 31.
45  See generally Shanor, supra note 33.
46  Zerwas, supra note 19, at 5358.
47  Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2712 (2010).
48  See News Release, U.S. Department of  Defense, Charges Referred on Detainee al Bahlul (Feb. 26, 2008), available at 
http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=11718; News Release, U.S. Department of  Defense, Detainee 
Convicted of  Terrorism Charge At Military Commission Trial (Nov. 3, 2008), available at http://www.defense.gov/
releases/release.aspx?releaseid=12329.
49  See United States v. Hamdan, CMCR 09–002, 2011 WL 2923945, at *15 (U.S. Crt. of  Mil. Comm’n Rev. June 24, 
2011) (explaining that 18 U.S.C. § 2339A and 18 U.S.C. § 2339B were “the basic model for the 2006 M.C.A. offense 
bearing the same name”).
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A. Ali Asad Chandia
1. Material Support Allegations
Ali Asad Chandia, a third-grade teacher,50 was convicted on multiple counts of  providing mate-
rial support to terrorists or terrorist organizations in violation of  18 U.S.C. § 2339A and § 2339B.51  
Following his conviction, the United States Probation Office prepared a presentence report (PSR) 
that detailed the offenses committed by Chandia.52  The PSR asserted that in late 2001, Chandia 
went to Pakistan and visited the office of  a designated foreign terrorist organization called Lashkar-
e-Taiba (LET), where he “inquired about the training that occurred at the LET military camp,” 
and asked “what type of  clothing was necessary.”53 The PSR “did not assert that Chandia actually 
went to a LET training camp while he was in Pakistan.”54 Additionally, the PSR stated that Chandia 
provided assistance such as transportation and computer access to Mohammed Ajmal Khan, a LET 
leader, after Khan arrived in the United States.55  On appeal, Chandia objected to a number of  the 
PSR’s allegations: he claimed that he had flown to Pakistan as a result of  familial obligations, that 
LET engages in non-terrorist work such as the operation of  schools and hospitals, and that he did 
not know Mohammed Ajmal Khan was in the United States on LET business.56 
2. Treatment of  Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project
In United States v. Chandia, the Fourth Circuit held that a district court did not properly resen-
tence Ali Asad Chandia and remanded the case for another resentencing.57  The court reasoned that 
the lower court failed to state specific facts regarding Chandia’s motive in providing material sup-
port to LET, a consequential error because specific intent is required for a sentencing court to apply 
the “federal crime of  terrorism” sentencing enhancement.58  The per curiam opinion utilized Holder v. 
Humanitarian Law Project in a discussion of  Chandia’s motives in providing material support to LET.59 
Specifically, the Chandia court pointed out that the defendant’s “knowledge of  LET’s terrorism-
related purpose was necessary to his conviction” under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B and, indeed, part of  the 
reason that § 2339B was not declared unconstitutional by Holder v. Humanitarian Project was the stat-
ute’s mens rea component, which requires that the defendant have knowledge that the organization 
receiving material support is a designated terrorist organization.60
50  Teacher Guilty of  Aiding Terror Group, usa toDay, June 6, 2006, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/
nation/2006-06-06-teacher-terror-group_x.htm. 
51  United States v. Chandia, 395 F. App’x 53, 54 (4th Cir. 2010).
52  See id. 
53  Id. at 55.
54  Id.
55  Id.
56  Id. at 56.
57  Id. at 60.
58  Id.
59  See id. at 59 n.4.
60  Id.
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The Chandia court’s use of  Humanitarian Law Project may appear to be merely ancillary to its deci-
sion. However, by referring to Humanitarian Law Project’s requirement that a defendant be aware of  
an organization’s ties to terrorism in order to be prosecuted for giving material support to that orga-
nization, the Chandia decision underscored that the constitutionality of  section 2339B rests upon the 
government differentiating between individuals who know that they are giving material support to 
a terrorist organization and individuals who are not aware of  the terrorist connections of  organiza-
tions that they support.  The former are prosecutable in the Fourth Circuit, the logic of  the Chandia 
court goes, while the latter are not.
B. Oussama Kassir
1. Material Support Allegations
Oussama Kassir was convicted on multiple counts of  providing material support to terrorists 
or terrorist organizations in violation of  18 U.S.C. § 2339A and § 2339B.61  According to the U.S. 
government, Kassir was sent to the United States by Abu Hamza, “a cleric at a London mosque 
widely known in England for the Jihadist sermons he delivered.”62  The government alleged that the 
following events occurred after Kassir arrived in the United States and set up shop in the Pacific 
Northwest:
Kassir gave instruction to small groups of  men on certain practical aspects of  violent Jihad.  
Kassir showed the men how to build and use a firearm silencer, and how to conduct effec-
tive nighttime surveillance of  a moving target.  In addition, Kassir . . . traveled . . . to a farm 
complex in Bly, Oregon.  This was the proposed location for the Jihad training camp.  At 
Bly, Kassir continued to provide guidance to Mosque associates with the workings of  Jihad.  
Kassir provided instruction on how to kill a man by slitting his throat, and disseminated 
information from an electronic version of  “the Encyclopedia of  Jihad.”63
After leaving the United States, Kassir allegedly established and maintained a number of  web-
sites that were used “to disseminate terrorist materials – including videos showing Jihadis participat-
ing in murder and torture, and instructions on how to make bombs and poisons.”64
2. Treatment of  Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project
In United States v. Mustafa, the Second Circuit held that 18 U.S.C. § 2339B was not unconstitu-
tional as applied to Oussama Kassir,65 rejecting Kassir’s claim that section 2339B is “unconstitution-
ally vague, overly broad, and infringes his First Amendment rights.”66  To arrive at its decision, the 
Mustafa court applied the due process test pronounced by Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project: “[a] 
61  United States v. Mustafa, 406 F. App’x 526, 528 (2d Cir. 2011).
62  United States v. Kassir, No. S2 04 Cr. 356(JFK), 2008 WL 2653952, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 3, 2008).
63  Id.
64  Id. at *2.
65  406 F. App’x at 530.
66  Id. at 528.
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conviction fails to comport with due process if  the statute under which it is obtained fails to provide 
a person of  ordinary intelligence fair notice of  what is prohibited, or is so standardless that it autho-
rizes or encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement.”67  According to the Mustafa court, Kas-
sir’s constitutional challenge to section 2339B had to fail because “knowingly providing jihad training 
and disseminating training manuals on the Internet for the benefit of  al Qaeda, and other terrorist 
organizations, implicate[d] the core meaning of  a statute that proscribes knowingly providing train-
ing and expert advice or assistance to a foreign terrorist organization.”68
The Mustafa court’s use of  Humanitarian Law Project shows that the latter case definitively laid to 
rest the argument that an individual involved in providing jihad training or disseminating jihad train-
ing materials could challenge a material support conviction on void-for-vagueness grounds, at least 
in the Second Circuit.
C. Rafiq Sabir
1. Material Support Allegations
Rafiq Sabir, a licensed emergency room doctor, was convicted of  providing and conspiring to 
provide material support to a terrorist organization in violation of  18 U.S.C. § 2339B.69  While speak-
ing to Tarik Shah (a friend who was also convicted for terrorism-related crimes) and Ali Soufan (an 
undercover FBI agent posing as a recruiter for al Qaeda), Sabir allegedly “expressed interest in meet-
ing with mujahideen operating in Saudi Arabia and agreed to provide medical assistance to any who 
were wounded.”70  The conversation allegedly progressed in the following way:
To ensure that Shah and Sabir were, in fact, knowingly proffering support for terrorism, 
Soufan stated that the purpose of  “our war, . . . our jihad” is to “[e]xpel the infidels from the 
Arabian peninsula,” and he repeatedly identified “Sheikh Osama” (in context a clear refer-
ence to Osama bin Laden) as the leader of  that effort.  Sabir observed that those fighting 
such a war were “striving in the way of  Allah” and “most deserving” of  his help.  To permit 
mujahideen needing medical assistance to contact him in Riyadh, Sabir provided Soufan with 
his personal and work telephone numbers.  When Shah and Soufan noted that writing down 
this contact information might create a security risk, Sabir encoded the numbers using a 
code . . . .71
According to the government, the direction that the conversation took next removed any re-
maining doubts about Sabir’s motives or awareness that he was committing to materially support al 
Qaeda: 
Sabir and Shah then participated in bayat, a ritual in which each swore an oath of  allegiance 
67  Id. at 530 (citing Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2718 (2010)).
68  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
69  United States v. Farhane, 634 F.3d 127, 132 (2d Cir. 2011).
70  Id. at 133.
71  Id. (citations omitted).
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to al Qaeda, promising to serve as a “soldier of  Islam” and to protect “brothers on the path 
of  Jihad ” and “the path of  al Qaeda.”  The men further swore obedience to “the guardians 
of  the pledge,” whom Soufan expressly identified as “Sheikh Osama,” i.e., Osama bin Laden, 
and his second in command, “Doctor Ayman Zawahiri.”72
2. Treatment of  Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project
In United States v. Farhane, the Second Circuit held that 18 U.S.C. § 2339B is neither facially vague 
(i.e., in conflict with the Due Process Clause) nor overbroad (i.e., in conflict with the First Amend-
ment) as applied to Rafiq Sabir.73  Sabir had argued that the statute’s prohibitions “afford insufficient 
notice to persons who may traduce those prohibitions and inadequate standards for authorities who 
must enforce them,” and the statutory exception to the definition of  material support for medical 
materials carved out in section 2339A(b)(1) was “too vague to have put him on notice that it did not 
encompass his consultative services as a physician.”74  The court rejected these claims by turning to 
the majority opinion in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, which had “foreclosed” vagueness com-
plaints regarding section 2339B.75  To dismiss Sabir’s contention that “his offer of  life-saving medical 
treatment was simply consistent with his ethical obligations as a physician and not reflective of  any 
provision of  support for a terrorist organization,”76 the Farhane court again turned to Humanitarian 
Law Project, this time to cite the distinction that that the Supreme Court had made between person-
nel working under the control of  a terrorist organization and individuals working independently.77  
Rafiq Sabir, the Farhane court explained, “was not prosecuted for performing routine duties as a 
hospital emergency room physician, treating admitted persons who coincidentally happened to be al 
Qaeda members,” but instead “was prosecuted for offering to work for al Qaeda as its on-call doc-
tor, available to treat wounded mujahideen who could not be brought to a hospital precisely because 
they would likely have been arrested for terrorist activities.”78
The Farhane court’s use of  Humanitarian Law Project clarified that an individual that gives or at-
tempts to give or conspires to give medical assistance to terrorists while under the control of  terror-
ists has violated a material support statute, despite the exception for medical materials carved out in 
18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1).  As a result of  this decision, claims of  vagueness or overbreadth akin to the 
claims brought by Rafiq Sabir will be rejected, at least in the Second Circuit.
72  Id (citations omitted).
73  Id. at 136.
74  Id.
75  Id. at 140.
76  Id. at 141.
77  Id.
78  Id.
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D. Ali Hamza Ahmad Suliman al Bahlul
1. Material Support Allegations
Ali Hamza Ahmad Suliman al Bahlul was convicted of  providing material support and resources 
to al Qaeda by a military commission.79  The military commission’s decision provides the following 
set of  facts about al Bahlul:
Appellant, a self-described “officer” in al Qaeda, joined that group with knowledge that al 
Qaeda engaged in terrorism and did so in complete agreement with Usama bin Laden’s dec-
larations that all Americans and anyone in the United States were legitimate targets of  armed 
attack.  Following completion of  al Qaeda’s military-like training, appellant met personally 
with bin Laden, discussed al Qaeda’s view of  itself  as a government in exile for the Mus-
lim world engaged in jihad (or “holy war”) with the United States, and pledged his personal 
fealty, including his willingness to die for bin Laden and al Qaeda.  Bin Laden then assigned 
appellant to al Qaeda’s media office and later as his personal assistant/secretary for public 
relations.80
The charges against al Bahlul with regard to material support were summarized as follows:
The primary resource charged was that he provided himself  to al Qaeda as a member; con-
sistent with the statute’s explicit recognition of  “personnel [including] oneself ” as material 
support or resources.  [H]e traveled to Afghanistan to join al Qaeda, met with an al Qa-
eda leader, underwent military-type training at an al Qaeda sponsored camp, met with and 
pledged personal loyalty to bin Laden, and then joined al Qaeda.  Appellant was also charged 
with providing services in direct support of  bin Laden and al Qaeda including: preparation 
of  propaganda products intended for al Qaeda recruiting and indoctrination training, and 
inciting persons to commit terrorism; acting as personal and media secretary for bin Laden, 
facilitating the pledges of  loyalty to bin Laden and preparing the propaganda declarations 
styled as Martyr Wills for two suspected September 11, 2001 hijackers/pilots, researching 
the economic effect of  those attacks on the United States and providing the results to bin 
Laden, and operating and maintaining data processing equipment and media communica-
tions equipment for the benefit of  bin Laden and other al Qaeda leaders.81
2. Treatment of  Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project
In United States v. Al-Bahlul, the United States Court of  Military Commission Review held that 
the First Amendment did not apply to al Bahlul’s conduct, and even if  it did, the First Amendment 
was not violated.82  Al Bahlul had argued that because the Supreme Court drew a distinction between 
independent advocacy and advocacy in coordination with a terrorist organization in Holder v. Hu-
manitarian Law Project, the judge erred in his instructions to the members of  the tribunal because he 
79  United States v. al Bahlul, No. CMCR 09–001, 2011 WL 4916373, at *1 (U.S. Ct. Mil. Comm’n Rev. Sept. 9, 2011).
80  Id. at *4.
81  Id. at *31.
82  Id. at *76.
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did not tell them that his “political beliefs were not on trial.”83  The Court of  Military Commission 
Review rejected this argument by pointing out that, for a number of  reasons – including the fact 
that he is a noncitizen who carried out the behavior in question outside the United States – al Bahlul 
“is not entitled and does not have the rights and protections provided by the First Amendment.”84  
Moreover, the al Bahlul court ruled that even if  the First Amendment applied to the defendant’s 
speech, his prosecution would still be lawful because his speech was used to create an al Qaeda 
propaganda video intended “to incite others to join al Qaeda and to commit crimes against Ameri-
cans or other U.S. interests.”85  The al Bahlul court went further by describing al Bahlul’s propaganda 
video as “an integral part of  and intrinsically related to the commission of  terrorism” and therefore 
“unprotected speech integrally tied to unlawful criminal activity.”86
The al Bahlul court’s use of  Humanitarian Law Project cleared up an ambiguity regarding the latter 
case’s First Amendment implications.  That is, the al Bahlul opinion maintained that although Hu-
manitarian Law Project distinguished between independent advocacy and advocacy in coordination 
with terrorists, that distinction does not give rise to supplementary First Amendment protections for 
noncitizens who materially support terrorism via their speech outside the United States. 
E. The Liberty City Seven
1. Material Support Allegations
Narseal Batiste, Patrick Abraham, Stanley Grant Phanor, Naudimar Herrera, Burson Augustin, 
Lyglenson Lemorin, and Rotschild Augustine were indicted on charges that included providing ma-
terial support to terrorists or terrorist organizations in violation of  18 U.S.C. § 2339A and § 2339B.87  
The group was nicknamed the “Liberty City Seven” for the area of  Miami “where they gathered.”88  
Herrera and Lemorin were eventually acquitted, while the other five defendants were all convicted 
of  violating the material support statutes.89
According to the government, the five defendants were members of  the Miami branch of  the 
Moorish Science Temple, an organization that “mixed political and religious ideology with martial 
arts training.”90  The government alleged that the group had been “conspiring to overthrow the U.S. 
government and blow up the 110-story Sears Tower in Chicago, along with several FBI offices and 
the Miami federal court complex.”91  The evidence presented by the government at trial also sug-
83  Id. at *75.
84  Id. at *78.
85  Id. at *82.
86  Id.
87  Indictment at 1, United States v. Batiste, No. 06-20373-CR (S.D. Fla. June 22, 2006), available at http://www.justice.
gov/opa/documents/cts_batiste_indictment.pdf.
88  Paul Grant, Factbox: Miami Terrorism Trial of  Liberty City Seven, reuters (Dec. 13, 2007, 5:47 pm EST), http://www.
reuters.com/article/2007/12/13/us-usa-plot-profile-idUSN0733513120071213. 
89  United States v. Augustin, 661 F.3d 1105, 1110 (11th Cir. 2011).
90  Id. at 1111.
91  Grant, supra note 88.
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gested the following about the group’s plot: 
[The defendants] attempted to obtain the support of  al Qaeda to achieve their goals and 
discussed this desire with an individual cooperating with law enforcement who posed as a 
member of  al Qaeda. Believing they were dealing with that terrorist group, in March 2006, 
Batiste and other defendants pledged an oath of  allegiance to al Qaeda and supported a plan 
to destroy FBI buildings in the United States by taking photos of  the FBI Building in North 
Miami Beach, Florida, and other federal buildings in Miami-Dade County.92
2. Treatment of  Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project
In United States v. Augustin, the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that the evidence supporting the 
defendants’ convictions under sections 2339A and 2339B was “far from overwhelming” but held 
that it was impossible to say that the jury was “unreasonable” in concluding beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendants had violated the material support statutes.93  On appeal, the five convicted 
defendants had argued that, based on the Supreme Court’s opinion in Holder v. Humanitarian Law 
Project, “the photographing of  the federal buildings from publicly accessible vantage points does not 
constitute material support.”94  According to the defendants, Humanitarian Law Project “explained that 
§ 2339B barred only speech imparting a specialized skill or communicating specialized knowledge,” a 
distinction that they asserted “should also be applied to conduct, such that the unskilled conduct of  
taking photos of  federal buildings from vantage points accessible to the public should not constitute 
material support under § 2339B.”95 The Augustin court rejected this interpretation of  Humanitarian 
Law Project, instead holding that the “conduct triggering coverage” in Humanitarian Law Project was 
speech, unlike the conduct carried out by the Liberty City Seven, and therefore merited more rigor-
ous scrutiny.96  The Augustin court further explained that, in contrast to the circumstances in Humani-
tarian Law Project, the defendants’ violation of  the material support statute “turns on what they did, 
rather than what they said.”97  While the court conceded that the photographs themselves “would 
not actually have been material in furthering the proposed plot to attack the federal buildings,” the 
fact that the defendants had volunteered their services to al Qaeda “was sufficient for a jury to deem 
it material support in the form of  personnel.”98
The Augustin court’s use of  Humanitarian Law Project elucidated the latter case’s implications for 
prosecuting individuals that have allegedly materially supported terrorists or a terrorist organization 
by providing “unskilled conduct” such as taking photographs.  That is, the Augustin opinion first rec-
ognized that Humanitarian Law Project differentiated between unlawful speech that “imparts a ‘specific 
92  Jim Kouri, Liberty City Six al Qaeda Cell Convicted for Conspiracy to Kill Americans, exaMiner.CoM (May 19, 2009), 
http://www.examiner.com/law-enforcement-in-national/liberty-city-six-al-qaeda-cell-convicted-for-conspiracy-to-kill-
americans. 
93  661 F.3d at 1122.
94  Id. at 1120.
95  Id.
96  Id. (quoting Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2724 (2010)). 
97  Id.
98  Id.
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skill’ or communicates advice derived from ‘specialized knowledge’” and lawful speech that “imparts 
only general or unspecialized knowledge,” and then proclaimed that such differentiation does not 
apply to nonspeech conduct. Thus, in the Eleventh Circuit (and perhaps elsewhere), actions that 
require no training – including tasks as menial as snapping a photograph – can violate the material 
support statutes if  the individuals that commit those actions believe that they are working in concert 
with terrorists or a terrorist organization .
v. two oPPosing Motions in the Mehanna trial
Tarek Mehanna, the aforementioned Massachusetts resident who was alternately characterized as 
an American exercising his constitutional rights and a devotee of  Osama bin Laden, was indicted on 
June 17, 2010.99  His alleged offenses included conspiring to provide material support or resources 
to al Qaeda in violation of  18 U.S.C. § 2339B and conspiring to provide material support to terror-
ists in violation of  18 U.S.C. § 2339A.100  Among the most controversial “overt acts” alleged by the 
government were Mehanna’s translations of  videos and publications.  For instance, the twenty-first 
“overt act” allegedly committed in furtherance of  Mehanna’s conspiracy to violate 18 U.S.C. § 2339B 
is worded in the following way:
On or about April 1, 2006, MEHANNA completed translation of  39 Ways to Serve and 
Participate in Jihad, which was intended to incite people to engage in violent jihad.101
Likewise, the nineteenth “overt act” allegedly committed in furtherance of  Mehanna’s conspira-
cy to violate 18 U.S.C. § 2339A is worded in the following way: 
On or about February 7, 2006, MEHANNA sent via the internet to A (whose true name is 
known to the Grand Jury) a video entitled the “Expedition of  Umar Hadid,” also referred to 
as “Ghazwah Umar Hadeed” or “GUH.”  MEHANNA described Umar Hadid as a terror-
ist leader in Fallujah, Iraq, who was associated with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of  al 
Qa’ida in Iraq.  The GUH video is captioned “released by al Qaidah Network in the land 
of  the Two Rivers [Iraq]” “Media Wing,” and contains, among other things, combat foot-
age from Iraq and footage of  Musab al-Zarqawi speaking in the beginning of  the video and 
Usama bin Laden at the end of  the video, that is over an hour long. On February 7, 2006, 
MEHANNA told A that he [MEHANNA] had help prepare and translate the video he was 
sending: “it’s the Umar Hadid vid[eo] . . . but w/ added clips . . . and its transed [translated] 
into English . . . by yours truly.102
On August 18, 2011, Mehanna’s attorneys filed a pre-trial motion to dismiss three counts of  
the indictment because “18 U.S.C. § 2339A and 18 U.S.C. § 2339B [were] unconstitutionally vague 
99  Second Superseding Indictment at 1, United States v. Mehanna, No. 09-CR-10017-GAO (D. Mass. June 17, 2010), 
2010 WL 2516469.
100  See id.
101  Id. at 8.
102  Id. at 15-16.
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and overbroad, both on their face and as applied to the defendant.”103  The attorneys argued that 
the statutes were vague because they “do not put individuals on notice that if  they encourage jihad 
in the abstract or they translate jihadi material, whether or not they are acting in coordination with 
terrorists or a terrorist organization, they are committing the crime of  providing material support 
to terrorists or to a terrorist organization.”104  To support this line of  reasoning, Mehanna’s attor-
neys pointed to Humanitarian Law Project’s oft-cited distinction between “concerted activity” and 
“independent advocacy,” as well as the government’s concession that Mehanna never acted under 
the direction or control of  al Qaeda.105  To support their overbreadth claim, Mehanna’s attorneys 
also cited Humanitarian Law Project, specifically the majority opinion’s acknowledgment that uphold-
ing the constitutionality of  the material support statutes in the case did not imply that “any future 
applications of  the material-support statute to speech or advocacy [would] survive First Amendment 
scrutiny.”106  Employing Humanitarian Law Project’s cautionary statement, the attorneys asserted that 
the material support statutes, as applied to Tarek Mehanna, were overbroad and infringed upon First 
Amendment rights because they “almost completely prohibit[ed] independent advocacy for Al-Qae-
da and distribution of  information about Al-Qaeda causes.”107
In response, the government filed a pre-trial motion opposing the defendant’s motion to dismiss 
three counts of  the indictment on September 2, 2011.108  Like the defense, the government em-
ployed Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project to buttress its arguments.  To counter Mehanna’s vagueness 
claim, the government pointed out that Humanitarian Law Project specifically provided that section 
2339B was not unconstitutionally vague and, in fact, “place[d] people of  ordinary intelligence on 
notice as to what is prohibited.”109  With regard to Mehanna’s activities, the government put forth 
that a reasonable person of  ordinary intelligence “would recognize that agreeing and attempting to 
translate, digitally edit, and disseminate specific media for the purpose of  supporting terrorists and 
terrorist organizations constituted the provision of  ‘services,’ ‘expert advice and assistance,’ as well 
as ‘personnel.’”110  To counter Mehanna’s overbreadth claim, the government noted that Humanitar-
ian Law Project held that the First Amendment rights of  individuals are not undermined by the mate-
rial support statutes because American citizens “may say anything they wish on any topic,”111 and, in 
Mehanna’s case, the “types of  material support that the indictment allege[d] the defendant furnished 
– property, services, currency and monetary instruments, training, expert advice and assistance, 
103  Defendant’s Memorandum of  Law in Support of  His Motion to Dismiss Counts One Through Three Based on 
Vagueness and Overbreadth at 1, United States v. Mehanna, No. 09-CR-10017-GAO (D. Mass. Aug. 18, 2011), 2011 WL 
3740563.
104  Id. at 3.
105  Id. at 5.
106  Id. at 16 (citing Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2730 (2010)).
107  Id. at 17-18.
108  Government’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Counts One through Three of  the Second 
Superseding Indictment Based on Overbreadth and Vagueness at 1, United States v. Mehanna, No. 09 CR 10017 GAO 
(D. Mass. Sept. 2, 2011), 2011 WL 3959520.
109  Id. at 2 (citing Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705).
110  Id. at 6.
111  Id. at 9 (citing Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2722-23).
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facilities and personnel – had only a tangential relationship to speech.”112  Mehanna’s unlawful con-
duct was not his controversial statements, the government seemed to imply, but the services (such as 
translating and distributing media) that he provided to al Qaeda.
After weighing these competing claims in a pre-trial status conference on September 7, 2011, 
Judge George O’Toole denied Tarek Mehanna’s motion to dismiss three counts of  his indictment 
based on overbreadth and vagueness.113  On December 20, 2011, Mehanna was found guilty on all 
charges, including the material support to terrorism charges.114 On April 12, 2012, Mehanna was 
sentenced to 17 ½ years in prison.115 
vi. ConClusion
A. The Contours of  the Material Support Statutes
To get the lay of  the legal land as regards the material support to terrorism statutes, this Article 
has explored the ways that appellate courts have utilized Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project.  Care-
ful analysis of  the five cases surveyed in the preceding pages of  this article yields two meaningful 
insights about the application of  18 U.S.C. § 2339A and § 2339B: (1) there is remarkable consistency 
among the courts in this context, and (2) there is a relatively precise dividing line between lawful and 
unlawful activities.
1. Remarkable Consistency
In the aftermath of  Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, prosecutions for terrorist material sup-
port offenses have been upheld in a remarkably consistent fashion.  In nearly every case surveyed, 
judges examined material support violations while sticking close to the message of  Humanitarian Law 
Project.  Despite the tangible alarm that has materialized in certain sectors of  the legal community, it 
seems that federal courts have confirmed that they will not uphold convictions of  individuals who 
are guilty of  merely voicing their opinions.  In Ali Asad Chandia’s case (United States v. Chandia), the 
Fourth Circuit confirmed that knowledge of  a group’s connections to terrorism is a necessary condi-
tion for an individual to be prosecuted under the material support statutes.116  In Oussama Kassir’s 
case (United States v. Mustafa), the Second Circuit confirmed that providing jihad training and dissemi-
nating materials to facilitate jihad training are violations of  the material support statute.117  In Rafiq 
112  Id.
113  See Court Docket, U.S. District Court for the District of  Massachusetts (Boston), Electronic Clerk’s Notes for 
Proceedings Held Before Judge George A O’Toole, United States v. Mehanna, (D. Mass. 2011), (No. 09-CR-10017) (describing 
proceedings as a  “STATUS CONFERENCE AS TO TAREK MEHANNA HELD ON 9/7/2011. DEFENDANT’S 
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR VAGUENESS . . . IS DENIED”).
114  Abby Goodnough, U.S. Citizen is Convicted in Plot to Support Al Qaeda, n.y. tiMes, Dec. 20, 2011, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2011/12/21/us/us-citizen-is-convicted-in-plot-to-aid-al-qaeda.html.
115  Daniel Lovering, Massachusetts Man Gets 17-1/2 Years in Prison for Aiding Al Qaeda, reuters (Apr. 12, 2012, 7:59pm 
EDT), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/12/us-usa-security-mehanna-idUSBRE83B1O320120412.
116  United States v. Chandia, 395 F. App’x 53, 58-59 (4th Cir. 2010).
117  United States v. Kassir, No. S2 04 Cr. 356(JFK), 2008 WL 2653952, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 3, 2008).
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Sabir’s case (United States v. Farhane), the Second Circuit confirmed that giving medical assistance to 
terrorists while working in concert with those terrorists is a violation of  the material support stat-
ute.118  In Ali Hamza Ahmad Suliman al Bahlul’s case (United States v. al Bahlul), the United States 
Court of  Military Commission confirmed that speech originating from a member of  a terrorist 
group that is intended to incite others to become terrorists or join terrorist groups qualifies as mate-
rial support to terrorism.119  In the Liberty City Seven’s case (United States v. Augustin), the Eleventh 
Circuit confirmed that basically any service – but not any speech – that is carried out in concert with 
terrorists is material support to terrorism.120
In all of  these cases, across all of  these circuits, across civil and military jurisdictions, these 
courts maintained that it is never a crime to merely speak one’s mind.  These courts heeded the 
language of  the material support statutes, especially subsection (i) of  18 U.S.C. § 2339B, which clari-
fies that the material support statutes are not allowed to infringe upon the First Amendment and do 
not apply to acts carried out by individuals who act entirely independently.  These courts have also 
complied with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project that while individuals 
are free to speak about any topic and are free to even join terrorist groups, they are forbidden from 
giving assistance to terrorism in almost any form.  That is, free speech has remained sacrosanct, 
but certain methods of  supporting terrorism – even some that may appear to be just speech – are 
against the law.
All of  the defendants in the cases surveyed can be distinguished from individuals who exercised 
their Constitutional rights of  free speech and free association.  Chandia was convicted because he 
gave computer access and transportation to one of  the leaders of  a designated foreign terrorist orga-
nization.  Kassir was convicted because he trained individuals to commit terrorist acts and was plan-
ning to set up a terrorist training camp on American soil.  Sabir was convicted because he had joined 
a terrorist group and planned to help other members of  that group carry out terrorist attacks by giv-
ing wounded terrorists medical assistance.  Al Bahlul was convicted because, among other things, he 
was a personal assistant to the mastermind behind the September 11th terrorist attacks.  Members 
of  the Liberty City Seven were convicted because they swore allegiance to a terrorist group and then 
took steps to prepare for a terrorist attack.  None of  these defendants were punished for speaking 
their minds, joining a particular group, or independently advocating for any causes; they were all 
convicted because their actions constituted material support per the holding of  the Supreme Court 
in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project.
2. A Relatively Precise Dividing Line
Reconciling the five appellate opinions surveyed above is easy because all of  the cases draw a 
perceptible, albeit nuanced, line between legal, constitutionally-protected activities and illegal, crim-
inally-punishable acts.  Fears that the material support statutes can be manipulated to proscribe any 
118  United States v. Farhane, 634 F.3d 127, 141 (2d Cir. 2011).
119  United States v. al Bahlul, No. CMCR 09–001, 2011 WL 4916373, at *82 (U.S. Ct. Mil. Comm’n Rev. Sept. 9, 
2011).
120  United States v. Augustin, 661 F.3d 1105, 1120 (11th Cir. 2011).
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action are misguided because individuals can only be prosecuted if  they have committed certain acts 
under a specific set of  circumstances.  Had Chandia not known that the individual he was provid-
ing with transportation and computer access was a terrorist, then he would not have violated the 
material support statutes.  If  Kassir had not been planning to wage jihad, he would have been acting 
within the confines of  the law when he visited an Oregon farm and instructed people on how to use 
firearm silencers and conduct nighttime surveillance.  If  Sabir had been an emergency room physi-
cian who, by chance, happened to give medical assistance to members of  al Qaeda, then he would 
have been innocent of  any crimes.  When Sabir swore an oath of  allegiance to al Qaeda and then 
made plans to treat wounded al Qaeda fighters so that those fighters would live to terrorize another 
day, however, he broke the law.  Al Bahlul was not convicted for believing in al Qaeda’s ideology 
or even for being an officer of  al Qaeda – he was convicted for assisting al Qaeda conduct public 
relations and producing propaganda aimed to incite people to wage jihad against the United States.  
Of  course the members of  the Liberty City Seven could ordinarily take pictures of  most anything 
without breaking the law, but the law forbade them from taking any actions in furtherance of  their 
scheme to blow up federal buildings in Florida.  In every case, the material support statutes were 
violated because a defendant crossed a demarcated line between lawful and proscribed activities.
B. The Progeny of  Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project in Context
The September 11th terrorist attacks fundamentally changed both the nature of  law enforce-
ment in the United States and the law’s perception of  the types of  activities that constitute threats to 
national security.  Following the previously unimaginable loss of  nearly 3,000 American lives in a sin-
gle day, Congress passed and the President signed the material support statutes to punish those who 
might assist in the orchestration of  future terrorist attacks.  In Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, the 
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of  those statutes, even though they criminalize countless 
actions that would be legal but for their connection to terrorism.  By forbidding individuals from 
supporting terrorists, the logic went, terrorists would be less likely to successfully strike again.
In the five cases surveyed in this article, each court went out of  its way to uphold the values of  
the Constitution and draw meaningful distinctions between constitutionally-protected activities and 
criminally-punishable acts.  Under the law, people are still free to say anything they like, but not if  
their speech knowingly assists terrorists or a terrorist organization.  Under the law, people are still 
free to associate with whomever they please, but if  they join a terrorist group, some of  their even 
seemingly harmless actions might constitute material support to terrorism.  Michael J. Ellis was right 
to point out that members of  foreign terrorist organizations would be proscribed from taking many 
different types of  actions.  Indeed, members of  terrorist groups appear to be straitjacketed by the 
material support statutes.  But after 9/11, what else could the United States do but restrict the activi-
ties of  members of  terrorist groups?  Irrespective of  the answer to that normative question, the fact 
remains that federal courts appear to have consistently given deference not only to the logic behind 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, but also to spirit that was behind 
the passing of  the Patriot Act in 2001.
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C. Revisiting the Mehanna Motions
It came as little surprise to anyone that the federal judge presiding over Tarek Mehanna’s trial de-
nied the defense counsel’s motion to dismiss the material support counts of  Mehanna’s indictment 
based on overbreadth and vagueness.  After all, the constitutionality of  the material support statutes 
had been definitively upheld by Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project and its progeny.121  Nonetheless, 
Mehanna’s defense attorneys latched onto Humanitarian Law Project to support their motion.122  Their 
misplaced citations are evidence that, despite a number of  appellate-level decisions that refer to the 
case and the publication of  academic analyses of  the majority opinion, Holder v. Humanitarian Law 
Project remains mystifying to some members of  the legal community. 
121  See supra Part IV.
122  See generally Defendant’s Memorandum of  Law in Support of  His Motion to Dismiss Counts One Through Three 
Based on Vagueness and Overbreadth, United States v. Mehanna, No. 09-CR-10017-GAO (D. Mass. Aug. 18, 2011), 
2011 WL 3740563. 
